Brandon Sullivan & Bleakley ✍ continue their examionation of the IRA war making capacity in the 1990s.
Republican Movement Thinking at the Beginning of 1992
Before starting this piece, we did two things. The first was watched Pop Goes Northern Ireland 1992. We cannot recommend this documentary series highly enough, and urge all those interested in the conflict to watch it. The second was reading the first edition of the Irish People – We had hoped to find a copy of the IRA’s traditional new year statement, but were unable to do so. But we did find some other articles that give an idea of where the IRA was at in 1992. The War News section detailed a number of standard IRA operations: blowing up security force bases, shooting soldiers, and also causing over £50m of damage in England. This total would be dwarfed in 1992. But the issue was fascinating for what else it contained.
Two of three cartoons were against the Free State – one seemingly condemning Garda harassment, and the other, rather cleverly it has to be said, showing the “empty suits” of Fine Gael members, with one saying “as in all the other sectarian murders of Irish nationalists the real culprits are the IRA, of course!” Later on in the issue, there’s an interview with an IRA spokesperson about the Provo’s decision to dramatically cutdown on punishment shootings/beatings. And there was also an article celebrating a “spectacular Sinn Fein election victory” and details of an IPLO murder headlined “Sinn Fein Call for IPLO to Disband.” Criticism of the Southern political establishment; a tentative move towards a form of “normalisation” of crime and punishment; political success; and calls for republican dissidents to disband. This is all a far cry from one of the IRA’s “Year of Victory” statements in the 1970s.
The UFF “response” was murdering three politically uninvolved nationalists in a bookies, one of them a WW2 British army veteran and former prisoner-of-war. The IRA shot and killed a UFF member, Norman Truesdale, in 1993 alleging he was involved in the triple murder.
The IRA in the North – the IPLO
The IRA effected the single most complete wipeout of a paramilitary group in the whole conflict on Halloween 1992, an event which became known as The Night of the Long Knives. According to McDonald & Holland’s book INLA: Deadly Divisions, around 100 IRA volunteers were involved in a series of operations across the city which left one man, Sammy Ward, dead, and many others wounded, sometimes with devasting “kneecapping” injuries (IRA man Gerry Bradley wrote that “over 60” volunteers took part). That the IPLO ceased to exist following the assault isn’t in doubt. But interesting questions emerge about the timing of the IRA’s operation. Three key IPLO figures had died violently in the year leading up to Halloween 1992: Martin “Rook” O’Prey and Conor Maguire were killed by the UVF (Aug 91, April 92), and former French Foreign Legionnaire Patrick Sullivan was stabbed to death by criminal elements in the lower Falls (Feb 92). Sullivan’s killing has been investigated by the Police Ombudsman. Would the IRA have risked a republican feud if these three key figures were still active? It’s hard to say. But the IRA still had the personnel and equipment to launch city-wide attacks against an ostensibly armed enemy. The Night of the Long Knives was perhaps the final large scale operation the Belfast Brigade undertook.
The IRA in England
The day after (10th April) John Major’s surprise Conservative Party general election win, the IRA detonated the biggest bomb in England since World War 2 at The Baltic Exchange. It killed three civilians, wounded 91, and cost £800m (£1.73bn in today’s money) – 25% more than the cost of all of the bombs the IRA exploded in the North up until that point. A few hours later, also on 11th April, the IRA detonated a huge bomb elsewhere in London, but fortunately nobody was killed.
There were other IRA (and INLA) bombings in London in 1992. However, none were of the magnitude of the Baltic Exchange bombing. The effects of this bomb:
In other words, UKG was forced to become an insurer, or risk losing investment and jobs in London, because of the IRA threat.
Conclusion
It is arguable that the IRA in 1992 were less successful on their own terms than in 1991. That being said, the political and financial fallout of the bombs in London was immense.
The Chairman of the Police Federation said, in the December 1992 issue of Police Beat that “The past year has been difficult; the IRA have never been more destructive or the loyalists more murderous.” He was partially inaccurate – the IRA had never been as destructive, but loyalists had been more murderous during most of the 1970s. I couldn’t however find any calls for internment to be reintroduced. Perhaps it can be argued that the IRA was in decline in the North, but not in England.
Debate may continue as to whether that was managed decline, the result of attrition, or both.
1991 discussed here.
Republican Movement Thinking at the Beginning of 1992
Before starting this piece, we did two things. The first was watched Pop Goes Northern Ireland 1992. We cannot recommend this documentary series highly enough, and urge all those interested in the conflict to watch it. The second was reading the first edition of the Irish People – We had hoped to find a copy of the IRA’s traditional new year statement, but were unable to do so. But we did find some other articles that give an idea of where the IRA was at in 1992. The War News section detailed a number of standard IRA operations: blowing up security force bases, shooting soldiers, and also causing over £50m of damage in England. This total would be dwarfed in 1992. But the issue was fascinating for what else it contained.
Two of three cartoons were against the Free State – one seemingly condemning Garda harassment, and the other, rather cleverly it has to be said, showing the “empty suits” of Fine Gael members, with one saying “as in all the other sectarian murders of Irish nationalists the real culprits are the IRA, of course!” Later on in the issue, there’s an interview with an IRA spokesperson about the Provo’s decision to dramatically cutdown on punishment shootings/beatings. And there was also an article celebrating a “spectacular Sinn Fein election victory” and details of an IPLO murder headlined “Sinn Fein Call for IPLO to Disband.” Criticism of the Southern political establishment; a tentative move towards a form of “normalisation” of crime and punishment; political success; and calls for republican dissidents to disband. This is all a far cry from one of the IRA’s “Year of Victory” statements in the 1970s.
As with 1991, the first IRA killing of the year was hard to justify. On the 13th January, 22 year old nationalist, Michael “Mickey” Logue was killed with an under-car-bomb, and died in hospital of his terrible injuries. This happened in Coalisland, and the IRA apologised for the murder, saying they had been acted on “erroneous information.” A neighbour of the dead man helped get him out of the badly damaged car, later saying he'd heard “in general conversation” that "Mickey was one of the boys working on the barracks in the town." The IRA in Tyrone were still dedicated to killing those they believed were repairing the security force bases they repeatedly bombed and mortared.
Four days after Mickey Logue’s unjustifiable killing, the IRA carried out an attack that was described as “the worst attack on Protestant workers since Kingsmill.” In one sense, this is true. But the targets were not Protestants, they were those working on security force installations. In this case, the base was Lisnakelly, and the IRA believed they were targeting employees of the Henry Brothers, a company the IRA detested, and which lost a number of men. In fact, the IRA had “erroneous information again” – the eight men killed and six injured at Teebane worked for Karl Construction. But, in the IRA’s eyes, they were as legitimate a target as Henry Brothers. The firm they worked for was Karl Construction – named after an RUC member, Karl Blackbourne (aged only 19), who, with two colleagues, was shot dead by the IRA in Newry. Karl’s father, Cedric, owned the firm. Three of the casualties were part-time members of the security forces.
Was Teebane indicative of an IRA in decline? Jonathan Trigg in his book Death in the Fields: The IRA and East Tyrone quoted someone saying that Teebane was done at the behest of the East Tyrone Brigade’s OC, who decided not to tell most of his brigade “let alone Belfast.” The IRA in Tyrone had experienced losses at the hands of the security forces. Their families and the wider nationalist community had been targeted by resurgent loyalist paramilitaries. Perhaps Tyrone IRA were keen to “return the serve” or perhaps it was simply the continuation of a brutal but effective campaign against security force contractors. Cedric Blackbourne told an American journalist that “at least 30” of his workers quit in the aftermath of Teebane, but he also said the company kept on doing security force work.
On Good Friday, the IRA killed a member of the nationalist community, Brandon McWilliams. He was employed as a storeman at a UDR barracks, and was himself a former member of the Royal Ulster Rifles, and the Territorial Army. The IRA claimed he had “passed on intelligence” to the security forces, and that he had ignored repeated warnings to stop working for the UDR. Republicans killed four RUC officers, four British soldiers, and three members of the UDR. This was a significant drop in terms of security force “kills” since 1991 (19). The IRA did kill a significant loyalist figure, but the IRA were extremely active in another area: bombing.
The IRA in the North – bombing
The numbers can be interpreted in a number of ways. Had the IRA reduced the number of lethal attacks being initiated on the security forces? Or were the security forces just getting better at not being killed? Or a bit of both? One side of the IRA’s campaign which seemed most assuredly not to be in decline was bombing commercial, economic, or security force targets.
This included the biggest bomb to be exploded by the IRA in the North. Toby Harnden’s essential book on the South Armagh, Bandit Country, described the operation:
The target had been the forensic laboratory – specifically, items of evidence being analysed which were to be used against two South Armagh volunteers. The evidence had been locked in a vault elsewhere and was not damaged in the attack. One of the homes badly damaged belonged to hapless UVF bomber Martin Snodden. He received no compensation, on account of his murder conviction. Alongside IRA evidence would have been numerous items relating to forthcoming loyalist trials. The Knockbreda attack suggests that the IRA were as unperturbed at destroying evidence that could lead to loyalists being imprisoned as they were at damaging and/or destroying hundreds of PUL houses, and the resulting fury/backlash.
The IRA carried out scores of incendiary bombings during 1992, sometimes causing millions of pounds worth of damage. They also detonated huge car bombs, often in the heart of majority Protestant towns and villages, as well as the centre of Belfast. In their book about the UDA’s Belfast Brigade C Company, Mad Dog: The Rise and Fall of Johnny Adair and 'C Company', Jordan & Lister described some of these bombings and the loyalist reaction:
Four days after Mickey Logue’s unjustifiable killing, the IRA carried out an attack that was described as “the worst attack on Protestant workers since Kingsmill.” In one sense, this is true. But the targets were not Protestants, they were those working on security force installations. In this case, the base was Lisnakelly, and the IRA believed they were targeting employees of the Henry Brothers, a company the IRA detested, and which lost a number of men. In fact, the IRA had “erroneous information again” – the eight men killed and six injured at Teebane worked for Karl Construction. But, in the IRA’s eyes, they were as legitimate a target as Henry Brothers. The firm they worked for was Karl Construction – named after an RUC member, Karl Blackbourne (aged only 19), who, with two colleagues, was shot dead by the IRA in Newry. Karl’s father, Cedric, owned the firm. Three of the casualties were part-time members of the security forces.
Was Teebane indicative of an IRA in decline? Jonathan Trigg in his book Death in the Fields: The IRA and East Tyrone quoted someone saying that Teebane was done at the behest of the East Tyrone Brigade’s OC, who decided not to tell most of his brigade “let alone Belfast.” The IRA in Tyrone had experienced losses at the hands of the security forces. Their families and the wider nationalist community had been targeted by resurgent loyalist paramilitaries. Perhaps Tyrone IRA were keen to “return the serve” or perhaps it was simply the continuation of a brutal but effective campaign against security force contractors. Cedric Blackbourne told an American journalist that “at least 30” of his workers quit in the aftermath of Teebane, but he also said the company kept on doing security force work.
On Good Friday, the IRA killed a member of the nationalist community, Brandon McWilliams. He was employed as a storeman at a UDR barracks, and was himself a former member of the Royal Ulster Rifles, and the Territorial Army. The IRA claimed he had “passed on intelligence” to the security forces, and that he had ignored repeated warnings to stop working for the UDR. Republicans killed four RUC officers, four British soldiers, and three members of the UDR. This was a significant drop in terms of security force “kills” since 1991 (19). The IRA did kill a significant loyalist figure, but the IRA were extremely active in another area: bombing.
The IRA in the North – bombing
The numbers can be interpreted in a number of ways. Had the IRA reduced the number of lethal attacks being initiated on the security forces? Or were the security forces just getting better at not being killed? Or a bit of both? One side of the IRA’s campaign which seemed most assuredly not to be in decline was bombing commercial, economic, or security force targets.
This included the biggest bomb to be exploded by the IRA in the North. Toby Harnden’s essential book on the South Armagh, Bandit Country, described the operation:
On 23rd September ... the South Armagh Brigade hijacked a van near Newry, packed it with 3,500 of explosives, drove it to Belfast and abandoned it outside the Forensic Science Laboratory in Newtownbreda ... after a coded warning had been issued, the device exploded, almost demolishing the laboratory and damaging 1,002 homes in the area, most of them on the loyalist Belvoir estate.
The IRA carried out scores of incendiary bombings during 1992, sometimes causing millions of pounds worth of damage. They also detonated huge car bombs, often in the heart of majority Protestant towns and villages, as well as the centre of Belfast. In their book about the UDA’s Belfast Brigade C Company, Mad Dog: The Rise and Fall of Johnny Adair and 'C Company', Jordan & Lister described some of these bombings and the loyalist reaction:
In November, the UFF issued a statement responding to an IRA bomb blitz that had damaged hundreds of Protestant homes in Northern Ireland. Two months earlier, as the Provisionals stepped up their campaign in Britain with a firebomb attack on the Hyde Park Hilton Hotel, a 1,000 Ib bomb had destroyed the Northern Ireland Forensic Science Laboratory in Belfast’s loyalist Belvoir estate, wrecking 1,000 homes. In October, as IRA bombs continued to explode in central London, a 200 Ib device ripped through the commercial heart of Bangor, Co. Down, while at least 100 homes were damaged when a car bomb exploded outside a police station in another Protestant town, Glengormley. In a telephoned statement to the BBC, the UFF warned that, as of midnight on 6 November, any further bombs in Protestant areas would be responded to with attacks against ‘the republican community as a whole’. Its riposte, it said, would be similar to its action after the massacre at Teebane, a grim reference to the carnage at the Ormeau Road.
The UFF “response” was murdering three politically uninvolved nationalists in a bookies, one of them a WW2 British army veteran and former prisoner-of-war. The IRA shot and killed a UFF member, Norman Truesdale, in 1993 alleging he was involved in the triple murder.
The IRA in the North – the IPLO
The IRA effected the single most complete wipeout of a paramilitary group in the whole conflict on Halloween 1992, an event which became known as The Night of the Long Knives. According to McDonald & Holland’s book INLA: Deadly Divisions, around 100 IRA volunteers were involved in a series of operations across the city which left one man, Sammy Ward, dead, and many others wounded, sometimes with devasting “kneecapping” injuries (IRA man Gerry Bradley wrote that “over 60” volunteers took part). That the IPLO ceased to exist following the assault isn’t in doubt. But interesting questions emerge about the timing of the IRA’s operation. Three key IPLO figures had died violently in the year leading up to Halloween 1992: Martin “Rook” O’Prey and Conor Maguire were killed by the UVF (Aug 91, April 92), and former French Foreign Legionnaire Patrick Sullivan was stabbed to death by criminal elements in the lower Falls (Feb 92). Sullivan’s killing has been investigated by the Police Ombudsman. Would the IRA have risked a republican feud if these three key figures were still active? It’s hard to say. But the IRA still had the personnel and equipment to launch city-wide attacks against an ostensibly armed enemy. The Night of the Long Knives was perhaps the final large scale operation the Belfast Brigade undertook.
The IRA in England
The day after (10th April) John Major’s surprise Conservative Party general election win, the IRA detonated the biggest bomb in England since World War 2 at The Baltic Exchange. It killed three civilians, wounded 91, and cost £800m (£1.73bn in today’s money) – 25% more than the cost of all of the bombs the IRA exploded in the North up until that point. A few hours later, also on 11th April, the IRA detonated a huge bomb elsewhere in London, but fortunately nobody was killed.
There were other IRA (and INLA) bombings in London in 1992. However, none were of the magnitude of the Baltic Exchange bombing. The effects of this bomb:
destabilised the market for terrorism insurance on commercial properties. Given both the potentially very high costs associated with terrorist attacks on commercial property and the high degree of uncertainty associated with predicting the frequency and severity of those attacks, many insurers had withdrawn from the terrorism insurance market. Given the damaging impact on the wider economy should commercial properties become uninsurable, government intervention was deemed necessary.
In other words, UKG was forced to become an insurer, or risk losing investment and jobs in London, because of the IRA threat.
Conclusion
It is arguable that the IRA in 1992 were less successful on their own terms than in 1991. That being said, the political and financial fallout of the bombs in London was immense.
The Chairman of the Police Federation said, in the December 1992 issue of Police Beat that “The past year has been difficult; the IRA have never been more destructive or the loyalists more murderous.” He was partially inaccurate – the IRA had never been as destructive, but loyalists had been more murderous during most of the 1970s. I couldn’t however find any calls for internment to be reintroduced. Perhaps it can be argued that the IRA was in decline in the North, but not in England.
Debate may continue as to whether that was managed decline, the result of attrition, or both.
1991 discussed here.
⏩Brandon Sullivan is a middle-aged West Belfast émigré. He juggles fatherhood & marriage with working in a policy environment and writing for TPQ about the conflict, films, books, and politics.
⏩Bleakley is an IT consultant currently living in the south of Ireland. Covid-19 boredom spurred an interest in the nitty gritty of Irish history.