It’s become more complex than I first intended, more and more sources became available, and very interesting themes emerged. This piece is to explore two of those themes: Ulster Resistance, and the IRA’s 1993 Shankill bomb, which killed ten people, eight of whom were politically uninvolved civilians, including women and children.
Ulster Resistance and the UDA post Anglo-Irish Agreement
Sometime after taking control of the West Belfast UDA/UFF (hereafter referred to as the UDA), John James “Johnny” Adair met with an organisation, shadowy even by Irish paramilitary standards, in the pursuit of weaponry to step up his campaign against, he claims, the IRA. That organisation was Ulster Resistance. The number of dead nationalist civilians (and not a few unionists) and the scarcity of UDA-assassinated Belfast IRA men challenges some loyalist, and ( security force and media) narratives, that Adair and his comrades had “the IRA on the run. This is a theme that I will return to another time.
The BBC reported that the clownish Willie Frazer was Adair’s Ulster Resistance contact. Frazer lost his father, and other close relatives, to the IRA. A source said to me that Frazer’s father, Bertie Frazer, was targeted because of links to the UVF, as well as his UDR membership. The Historical Enquiries Team said there was no evidence of Bertie Frazer being a “terrorist suspect.”
Ian Cobain wrote an excellent article in The Guardian detailing the formation of Ulster Resistance, and that organisations links with the Democratic Unionist Party, up to and including leadership level. Cobain wrote:
The Sunday Tribune (20/11/88) reported that:
The DUP later officially “disassociated” themselves with Ulster Resistance. A founding member of the DUP, the brilliant lawyer Dessie Boal, told Eammon Mallie that, if he, Boal, were ever to write his memoirs, “If I did a lot of people might end up in gaol.” Interestingly, Boal “disassociated” himself from his decades long friendship with Ian Paisley over Paisley’s entering into government with Sinn Fein. Boal said he couldn’t stand the thought of Paisley governing with the men Boal had defended, often successfully, in court. Boal’s life and times would make for a fascinating biography.
When Adair met with Ulster Resistance, he put his case for access to the formidable arsenal that they possessed, writing in his autobiography:
Adair’s mention of Ulster Resistance having prison officers in their ranks is interesting, as a man who served in the prison service and UDR, was shot dead by the IRA. Charles Watson appears on a UVF Roll of Honour, and has been linked, by Martin Dillon, to Ulster Resistance.
Adair had other sources of weapons, but Ulster Resistance had a stock from a major arms shipment that loyalists received in 1987. The assault rifles, hand-grenades, and rocket launchers would feature in many UDA attacks until the 1994 ceasefires, and beyond.
Loyalists threaten violence “to a ferocity never imagined.”
On the 5th January 1993, the Independent newspaper reported that:
In 1993, up to and including the 15th October, loyalist militants killed 24 members of the nationalist community, including at least one member of the IRA, and two members of Sinn Fein. The death toll also included two women.
Andrew Silke in his superb analysis of the Shankill bombing, Beyond Horror noted that:
This is in stark contrast to the belief held by some loyalists that murdering members of the nationalist community would pressurise the IRA into calling off their campaign. In fact, it appears to have had a contradictory effect.
The IRA released a statement that said:
October 1993 – the targeting of Adair
An interesting chain of events took place in mid and late October 1993, concerning Johnny Adair.
On the 19th October 1993, an armed INLA unit was apprehended close to Adair’s home. The RUC noted that this was the fourth serious attempt on Adair’s life that year. That same day, Adair was noted by the RUC going into 275A Shankill Road, which was the UDA’s HQ in Belfast. Also on that day, an article appeared in the Guardian newspaper detailing the often squalid lifestyle and antics of a man named as the “UFF commander, West Belfast.” The IRA, as well as the RUC, were satisfied that the man in the article was Johnny Adair.
On the 22nd October 1993, the Irish Independent ran an article entitled “Face to face with the UFF’s Top Assassin.” Again, the RUC, and the IRA, were satisfied that the man detailed in the article was Johnny Adair.
Johnny Adair and 275A Shankill Road
Adair was noted by the RUC of entering 275A Shankill Road on numerous occasions. Furthermore, Adair gave his address as 275A Shankill Road on over 30 instances to the RUC. An RUC file on Adair noted his:
On the 10th of August 1992, Adair and another man, Curtis Moorehead, walked into Tennant Street RUC station to announce that they had, up until that day, been members of the UDA, but no longer were. The UDA was, finally, proscribed on that particular day. The RUC were able to demonstrate that Adair’s movements and associations remained identical pre and post UDA proscription. His relationship to 275A Shankill Road was a major part of this, comprising two full appendices (out of 13) of an RUC file evidencing Adair as a “Director of Terrorism.”
The day after Johnny Adair informed the RUC that he was no longer a member of the UDA, his brother, James, and another man, convicted rapist and child murderer Trevor Hinton (both members of the UDA) were remanded following the attempted murder of a nationalist civilian. Adair and Hinton had used knives and hammers to attempt to kill the man and were later convicted of attempted murder.
Brian Rowan, in his book Living With Ghosts, described the effect of Adair on the Belfast IRA like this:
Rowan is right that Adair was in the IRA’s plans, and that they were determined to kill him. Silke wrote that “The IRA had known for some time that senior members of the UDA, including Adair, met regularly on Saturdays at the West Belfast UDA headquarters.” The UDA HQ featured in a series of IRA plans to kill Adair and other UDA men involved in violence against the nationalist community.
The RUC heard from an informer that one plan was:
Another plan was to:
The IRA had heavy machines, DHSKs, capable of killing everyone even in a reinforced building but, according to Silke:
As determined as the IRA were, they would not undertake an operation without a solid chance of their volunteers and equipment “returning to base” safely. Silke reported that the IRA considered an attack with RPGs, but that the Provisionals viewed them as generally unreliable, but:
Ulster Resistance and the UDA post Anglo-Irish Agreement
Sometime after taking control of the West Belfast UDA/UFF (hereafter referred to as the UDA), John James “Johnny” Adair met with an organisation, shadowy even by Irish paramilitary standards, in the pursuit of weaponry to step up his campaign against, he claims, the IRA. That organisation was Ulster Resistance. The number of dead nationalist civilians (and not a few unionists) and the scarcity of UDA-assassinated Belfast IRA men challenges some loyalist, and ( security force and media) narratives, that Adair and his comrades had “the IRA on the run. This is a theme that I will return to another time.
The BBC reported that the clownish Willie Frazer was Adair’s Ulster Resistance contact. Frazer lost his father, and other close relatives, to the IRA. A source said to me that Frazer’s father, Bertie Frazer, was targeted because of links to the UVF, as well as his UDR membership. The Historical Enquiries Team said there was no evidence of Bertie Frazer being a “terrorist suspect.”
Ian Cobain wrote an excellent article in The Guardian detailing the formation of Ulster Resistance, and that organisations links with the Democratic Unionist Party, up to and including leadership level. Cobain wrote:
Ulster Resistance joined forces with the two established loyalist paramilitary groups, the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and Ulster Defence Association (UDA), to smuggle an enormous arsenal of weapons into the province, including about 200 Czech-made assault rifles called VZ58s and tens of thousands of rounds of ammunition.
Over the next 17 years, these VZ58s would be used in the murder or attempted murder of about 70 people in Northern Ireland. In the early 90s, they were used in three massacres: gunmen stood at the doors of a bookmaker’s shop and two bars, and simply sprayed the room. Nineteen people died and 27 were wounded.
The Sunday Tribune (20/11/88) reported that:
Speaking in the context of the huge arms finds in the past week, former [DUP] Lord Mayor of Belfast, Sammy Wilson, has defended ‘the right’ of loyalists to stockpile weapons.
The DUP later officially “disassociated” themselves with Ulster Resistance. A founding member of the DUP, the brilliant lawyer Dessie Boal, told Eammon Mallie that, if he, Boal, were ever to write his memoirs, “If I did a lot of people might end up in gaol.” Interestingly, Boal “disassociated” himself from his decades long friendship with Ian Paisley over Paisley’s entering into government with Sinn Fein. Boal said he couldn’t stand the thought of Paisley governing with the men Boal had defended, often successfully, in court. Boal’s life and times would make for a fascinating biography.
When Adair met with Ulster Resistance, he put his case for access to the formidable arsenal that they possessed, writing in his autobiography:
Their ranks were filled with prison officers, landowners, RUC men, even the clergy. Although they weren’t going to go on operations, Ulster Resistance snapped up their slice of the 1987 shipment in case of a doomsday situation. C Company was able to strike up a relationship with them and tap into their stocks. The more success we had, the happier Ulster Resistance were to hand over guns.
Adair had other sources of weapons, but Ulster Resistance had a stock from a major arms shipment that loyalists received in 1987. The assault rifles, hand-grenades, and rocket launchers would feature in many UDA attacks until the 1994 ceasefires, and beyond.
Loyalists threaten violence “to a ferocity never imagined.”
On the 5th January 1993, the Independent newspaper reported that:
“ON NEW YEAR'S EVE, a violent loyalist group, the Ulster Defence Association, issued a grim warning that it intended 'to intensify and widen our campaign in 1993 to a ferocity never imagined'.”
In 1993, up to and including the 15th October, loyalist militants killed 24 members of the nationalist community, including at least one member of the IRA, and two members of Sinn Fein. The death toll also included two women.
Andrew Silke in his superb analysis of the Shankill bombing, Beyond Horror noted that:
Predictably, the relentless attacks and the mounting numbers of people killed and injured, led to an increasingly tense atmosphere in Catholic areas in general and in nationalist West and North Belfast in particular. The IRA found themselves under growing pressure to respond to the loyalist threat. Pressure to do something grew within the movement as well and IRA commanders in Belfast experienced increasing grassroots unrest, as men on the ground became more and more anxious to take some action against the loyalists.
This is in stark contrast to the belief held by some loyalists that murdering members of the nationalist community would pressurise the IRA into calling off their campaign. In fact, it appears to have had a contradictory effect.
The IRA released a statement that said:
[W]e in the IRA are very clear about a number of issues. One is that no-one should respond to the activities of the loyalist death squads in anything but a disciplined manner. We in the IRA will under no circumstances play into British hands by going down the cul-de-sac of sectarian warfare, which would allow our enemy to portray itself as somehow holding the ring between warring factions in Ireland. But as we have demonstrated . . . there is no hiding place for those involved with the loyalist death squads. We are determined to exact a price from them. No one should be under any illusions. Those involved with the loyalist death squads will be held accountable for their actions.
October 1993 – the targeting of Adair
An interesting chain of events took place in mid and late October 1993, concerning Johnny Adair.
On the 19th October 1993, an armed INLA unit was apprehended close to Adair’s home. The RUC noted that this was the fourth serious attempt on Adair’s life that year. That same day, Adair was noted by the RUC going into 275A Shankill Road, which was the UDA’s HQ in Belfast. Also on that day, an article appeared in the Guardian newspaper detailing the often squalid lifestyle and antics of a man named as the “UFF commander, West Belfast.” The IRA, as well as the RUC, were satisfied that the man in the article was Johnny Adair.
On the 22nd October 1993, the Irish Independent ran an article entitled “Face to face with the UFF’s Top Assassin.” Again, the RUC, and the IRA, were satisfied that the man detailed in the article was Johnny Adair.
Johnny Adair and 275A Shankill Road
Adair was noted by the RUC of entering 275A Shankill Road on numerous occasions. Furthermore, Adair gave his address as 275A Shankill Road on over 30 instances to the RUC. An RUC file on Adair noted his:
… propensity to give the address of UDA headquarters as his personal address on number occasions both pre and post UDA proscription.
On the 10th of August 1992, Adair and another man, Curtis Moorehead, walked into Tennant Street RUC station to announce that they had, up until that day, been members of the UDA, but no longer were. The UDA was, finally, proscribed on that particular day. The RUC were able to demonstrate that Adair’s movements and associations remained identical pre and post UDA proscription. His relationship to 275A Shankill Road was a major part of this, comprising two full appendices (out of 13) of an RUC file evidencing Adair as a “Director of Terrorism.”
The day after Johnny Adair informed the RUC that he was no longer a member of the UDA, his brother, James, and another man, convicted rapist and child murderer Trevor Hinton (both members of the UDA) were remanded following the attempted murder of a nationalist civilian. Adair and Hinton had used knives and hammers to attempt to kill the man and were later convicted of attempted murder.
Brian Rowan, in his book Living With Ghosts, described the effect of Adair on the Belfast IRA like this:
The IRA spoke of their absolute determination to made Adair ‘pay for his crimes’. He was inside their heads, inside their plans. They were chasing him, hunting him. And it was this fascination with him, that absolute determination to kill him, that led to the unthinking madness of the Shankill bomb.
Rowan is right that Adair was in the IRA’s plans, and that they were determined to kill him. Silke wrote that “The IRA had known for some time that senior members of the UDA, including Adair, met regularly on Saturdays at the West Belfast UDA headquarters.” The UDA HQ featured in a series of IRA plans to kill Adair and other UDA men involved in violence against the nationalist community.
The RUC heard from an informer that one plan was:
two IRA bombers would be dropped off by car about 20 yards from the building, and the driver would remain in the getaway car with the engine running. The two men, the coffee jars concealed under their jackets, would hurl the jars into the first floor offices and make their escape (Silke).
Another plan was to:
mount a heavy machine-gun on the back of a lorry, and rake the offices while a UDA meeting was taking place. The IRA certainly had the firepower to make this a serious threat. However, there was a rumour that the loyalists had reinforced the structure of the building, so an attack using one of the dozen or so general purpose machine-guns that the IRA possessed might not have been powerful enough.
The IRA had heavy machines, DHSKs, capable of killing everyone even in a reinforced building but, according to Silke:
… the IRA dropped the idea, claiming the possible UDA reinforcing made the plan unworkable. However, the real reason was different. The reality was that the IRA planners realized that using a DHSK in the circumstances of the planned attack would have severely undermined the likelihood that the attackers could escape successfully.
As determined as the IRA were, they would not undertake an operation without a solid chance of their volunteers and equipment “returning to base” safely. Silke reported that the IRA considered an attack with RPGs, but that the Provisionals viewed them as generally unreliable, but:
bombs have been much more successful weapons for the organization. With over 20 years of bomb-making and deployment behind them, the IRA at that time were arguably the most skilled terrorist group in the world when it came to the use of explosives.
So it was that the IRA chose to use a bomb to attack the UDA HQ at 275A Shankill Road.
The Shankill Bomb
The IRA’s bomb attack on the Shankill Road on 23rd October 1993, by any standards, was a disaster. There has been debate on this blog about the intention of the bombing, but I think it's clear that it was a targeted operation against Adair in particular, and high-ranking members of the UDA in general.
I would challenge Brian Rowan's assertion that it was "unthinking madness" - arguably, it is madness to use an explosive device in a civilian area at any time, but it had been done many other times, including in two attacks on bars in loyalist areas in 1994, without death or injury.
In their determination to kill Adair, the IRA unit definitely risked the lives of Protestant shoppers on the Shankill Road, but also their own lives. Silke wrote that:
Although the timer had failed disastrously, casualties could have been much higher but for the fact that the design of the rest of the bomb worked as the IRA had intended. The charge had been shaped so as to explode upward taking out the floors above the fish shop rather than damaging the buildings to either side. In this at least it succeeded and only two people outside of the shop were killed by the bomb.
As one senior security source put it:
The difference between that [the Shankill bombing] being a disaster and a stunning success in IRA terms was very marginal. The bomb was designed to direct the blast upwards, and it did—in the fruit shop next door the rows of oranges were hardly disturbed.
The aftermath
Silke wrote of “disarray” in the ranks of the Belfast IRA following the Shankill bomb. Loyalist paramilitaries predictably went on the rampage, so indiscriminate were their attacks that they killed two Protestants “accidently”, one of whom was a former B-Special. Looking back at statistics, CAIN notes that 26 nationalists were killed by loyalists before the Shankill bomb, whilst 16 were killed after it before the end of 1993.
Adair survived some more attempts on his life, before the RUC lifted him, and most of his UDA structure, off the streets and into remand, awaiting trial. Republicans killed eight loyalist paramilitaries in 1994, prior to calling their ceasefire at the end of August, as well as killing others ranging from Protestant cleaners to British soldiers and RUC officers.
Without the political manoeuvres which had been in place since the 1980s, an IRA ceasefire would have been highly unlikely. Silke described the internal pressure the IRA was under to “deal” with loyalist violence. I believe that the loyalist campaign, and potential republican response, could have dragged the North back to levels of violence last seen in the 1970s. I don’t think it would have been a high-intensity civil war situation, but, as ever, civilians would have borne the brunt of paramilitary excesses.
In the past few days, the media has reported that the UVF and UDA are “reviewing” their ceasefires. It is worth noting the intense misery, death, destruction and imprisonment the loyalist campaigns brought their own communities, as well as in nationalist communities.
⏩ Brandon Sullivan is a middle aged, middle management, centre-left Belfast man. Would prefer people focused on the actual bad guys.
